Peer Pressure in Work Teams: The effects of Inequity Aversion

David Masclet ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Many empirical studies have shed light on the efficiency of peer pressure. I propose here to model peer pressure by incorporating in the utility function self centered inequity aversion. I find that opportunity for sufficiently inequity averse players to punish their peers, is effective in inducing others to cooperate. At the equilibrium, all players cooperate and punish any shirker since punishing is a way to reduce inequity. Contrary, nobody cooperates without peer pressure even if players are inequity averse.

Keywords: cooperation; fairness; inequity aversion; peer pressure; work teams; aversion à l'inégalité; bienveillance; équipes de travail; pression des pairs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00178476
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in 2002

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00178476/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00178476

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().