Optimum intérieur et financement efficient d'un bien public:une expérience

Matthieu Neveu
Additional contact information
Matthieu Neveu: GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This experiment provides results in voluntary contribution for a public goods using a payoff function which defines a Pareto optimum inside the strategic contributions space. Two optima are tested. One is defined at 30% of the subjects' endowment, an the other at 70%. The Nash equilibrium of these games remains the non contribution to the public good. The experiment results show that the over but inefficient contribution is not due to a confusion made by the subjects but is rather due to the subjects' voluntary decision. Next, a public good is easily provided when the optimal point is defined at a low contribution level, even if it is not always fully provided. This last results highlight a coordination problem to reach the social optimum, and identify two behaviors named Reactive Behavior and Optimum Lover.

Keywords: experimental economics; free-riding; interior Pareto optimum; public goods; bien public; économie expérimentale; optimum intérieur (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00178479
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2002

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00178479/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00178479

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().