How fair is urban transport pricing perceived to be? An empirical study

Charles Raux () and Stéphanie Souche-Le Corvec
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Charles Raux: LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Regulation by means of price in order to remove excess demand is generally perceived as being unfair. This paper empirically tests different principles of regulation including lotteries, rationing, a moral rule and compensation. We confirm that peak-period pricing as a means of limiting demand is overwhelmingly rejected. Administrative allocation and lotteries are also rejected. The reference transaction can also lead to rejection of waiting line. Price compensation is overwhelmingly considered to be fair and the right to this is demanded both from public or private sector monopoly: it is possible therefore to reinstate pricing in the form of compensation.

Keywords: urban transport pricing; acceptability; regulation; price compensation; regulating congestion; justice; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Published in WCTRS, University of California. 11th World Conference on Transport Research - WCTR'07, June 24-28 2007, Berkeley, CA, 2007, Berkeley, United States. 31 p

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00179514

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