Large shareholder portfolios, monitoring and legal protection of shareholders: A note

Christian At and Laurent Flochel
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Laurent Flochel: GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We consider an optimal portfolio diversification model in which a large shareholder can influence shares return by monitoring efficiently managers. Less diversification decreases insurance but increases the stake in the ownership and then enhances efficiency of management monitoring. We analyze the effect of legal shareholders protection on portfolio diversification.

Keywords: corporate governance; large shareholders; optimal portfolio choice; choix de portefeuille; gouvernement d'entreprise; gros actionnaire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00179976v1
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Published in 2001

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00179976

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