The Sales of Small firms: a multidimensional analysis
Christian At and
Pierre-Henri Morand ()
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Abstract:
This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.
Keywords: auctions; security voting structure; small firms; enchères; PME; structure en droits de vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Published in 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis (2003) 
Working Paper: The sales of small firms: a multidimensional analysis (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00179998
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