Restrictions verticales et réputation des réseaux de franchise. Un travail empirique sur données françaises

Magali Chaudey (magali.chaudey@univ-st-etienne.fr) and Muriel Fadairo (muriel.fadairo@univ-st-etienne.fr)
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Muriel Fadairo: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Abstract: This article confronts the agency argument for vertical restraints with French data concerning franchising networks. We address the influence of free-riding at the downstream level within the structure of franchise contracts. The franchisees' opportunism is problematic for the upstream unit because it erodes the reputation of the chain. We study how this potential behaviour affects the intensity of vertical restraints, using a multisector French data base. The results are consistent with the analytical framework, but strongly contrasted depending on the provision studied. They also suggest that concerning the design of contracts between a producer and his distributors, agency costs are just one part of the explanation.

Keywords: franchise; réseau; restrictions verticales (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
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Published in Revue Economique, 2007, 58 (4), pp.891-914

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00186757

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