Nash equilibrium existence for some discontinuous games

Philippe Bich ()
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Philippe Bich: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Answering to an open question of Herings et al. (see [3]), one extends their fixed point theorem to mappings defined on convex compact subset of Rn, and not only polytopes. Such extension is important in non-cooperative game theory, where typical strategy sets are convex and compact. An application in game theory is given.

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Nash equilibrium; fixed point theorem; Jeux discontinus; Equilibres de Nash; point fixes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00188764v1
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Published in 2007

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