Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games

Vincent Iehlé ()
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Vincent Iehlé: CERMSEM - CEntre de Recherche en Mathématiques, Statistique et Économie Mathématique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.

Keywords: cooperative games; contestable markets; sustainability; subsidy free; parameterized cost games; jeux de coût paramétrés; subventions croisées; marchés contestables; soutenabilité; jeux coopératifs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00193961v1
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Published in 2004

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00193961

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