Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of mergers control by taking into account the possible efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested from a less efficient merged firm than from a more efficient one, wich conforms with the recommendations of competition policy practitioners. However, since cost savings are private information of merging firms, the Competition Authority will require them to reveal their efficiency gains, so as to tailor the optimal remedy. We propose a revelation mechanism combining the use of divestitures with the regulation of their sale price. We discuss the opportunity of such a merger policy tool, and argue that in practice it may be used to signal the efficiency gains of notified mergers.

Keywords: structural merger remedies; merger control; asymmetric information; contrôle des fusions; remèdes structurels; information asymétrique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00194906
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2005

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00194906/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains (2009)
Working Paper: Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains (2009)
Working Paper: Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains (2009)
Working Paper: Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains (2008)
Working Paper: Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains (2006)
Working Paper: Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00194906

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().