The core-partition of hedonic games

Vincent Iehlé ()
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Vincent Iehlé: CERMSEM - CEntre de Recherche en Mathématiques, Statistique et Économie Mathématique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: A pure hedonic game describes the situation where player's utility depends only on the identity of the members of the group he belongs to. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of core-partition in hedonic games. The condition is based on a new concept of balancedness, called pivotal balancedness. pivotal balancedness involves especially the notion pivotal distribution that associates to each coalition a sub-group of players in the coalition. Then, we proceed to a review of several sufficient conditions for core-partition existence showing how the results can be unified through suitably chosen pivotal distributions.

Keywords: Hedonic game; group formation; core-partition; balancedness; Jeu hédonistique; formation de groupes; coeur-partition; balancement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00197528v1
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Published in 2005

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00197528

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