Fondements théoriques des marchés de permis négociables: le théorème de Montgomery

Nathalie Berta ()
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Nathalie Berta: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, OMI - Organisation Marchandes et Institutions - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne

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Abstract: William Montgomery had established in 1972 the first rigorous theoretical result in favour of the creation of allowance permit markets. Being inspired by the works of John Dales and Kenneth Arrow, he showed that these markets have a competitive equilibrium which achieves exogenous standards of pollution at least cost to the polluting firms. We intend here to present this theorem, and to discus the way it can be use in the tax versus market debate in environmental economics.

Keywords: tradable permit market; competitive equilibrium; marché de permis négociables; pollution; équilibre concurrentiel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Économie appliquée : archives de l'Institut de science économique appliquée, 2006, LIX (4), pp.59-75

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00272188

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