Concurrence et délégation de services publics. Quelques enseignements de la théorie des coûts de transaction

Anne Yvrande-Billon ()
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Anne Yvrande-Billon: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The use of competitive tendering in utilities industries has been developing for two decades. The main theoretical argument behind this trend is that auctioning the right to provide a public good or service allows introducing competitive pressures in natural monopolies. However, in the light of the recent developments in Transaction Cost Economics, this conclusion needs to be qualified. Indeed, this approach highlights that franchising public services encounters several difficulties that we review and illustrate in this paper.

Keywords: Théorie des coûts de transaction; Services publics; Contrats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
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Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 2008, 22, pp.97-131

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00273376

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