The attribution process of delegation contracts in the french urban public transport sector: why competitive tendering is a myth

Anne Yvrande-Billon ()
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Anne Yvrande-Billon: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: This paper analyses the French recent experience of franchising in the urban public transport sector in the light of Transaction Cost Economics arguments. It provides theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidence explaining why the compulsory use of competitive tendering in this sector did not translate into better performance, the main reasons being the lack of transparency of the attribution process and the limited monitoring capabilities of local authorities.

Keywords: Competitive Tendering; Public Services; Transaction Cost Economics; Urban Transport (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2006, 77 (4), pp.453-478. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00315.x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00273378

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00315.x

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