The determinants of contract duration in the new British rail structure

Les déterminants du choix de la durée des contrats dans la nouvelle structure ferroviaire britannique

Anne Yvrande-Billon ()
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Anne Yvrande-Billon: ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: The 1993 reform of rail transport in Great Britain led to an outright break-up of the British Rail vertically integrated monopoly. All railway activities have been isolated and divided among private operators whose relationships are determined by short term bilateral contracts. This paper examines the relevance of these contractual choices. Transaction Cost Economics, which mainly concentrates on contractual coordination issues, provides a relevant analytical framework. We show that the contractual length chosen by the reformers is not efficient in the sense of transaction cost theory since it is not adapted to the features of rail assets.

Keywords: Contrats; Théorie des coûts de transaction; Industrie ferroviaire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03-31
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00273382
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Les Cahiers Scientifiques du Transport / Scientific Papers in Transportation, 2003, 43 | 2003, pp.147-163. ⟨10.46298/cst.12011⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00273382

DOI: 10.46298/cst.12011

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