Introducing performance indicators in the French Public Transport. An approach by the Agency Theory

Mounia Moudjed
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Mounia Moudjed: LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The public utilities are an interesting testing ground to understand the relation and asymmetry of information between an agent and his principle. The normative theory of agency and the positive theory of agency represent theory sphere of the contractual relation and the incentive and performance mechanisms. This theory sphere will be confronted by a comparative study on the telecommunication, electricity and urban public transport. Considered as public utility in France, the interest of this comparison will be focused on the contractual agreement and the role of the performance indicators as mechanisms of revelation of information and the consequence on the market structure. This comparison allows reconsider the regulation of the French public transport.

Keywords: regulation; performance; public utility; performance indicator; agency; contract; asymmetry of information; incentive; control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Published in Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Urbino. 4th Khumo – Nectar International Conference - Pricing, Financing, Regulating Transport Infrastructure and Services, July 12-13 2007, Urbino, 2007, Urbino, Italy

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