Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good:Experimental evidence

Pavel Diev and Walid Hichri

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Abstract: We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to update upwards their contribution during a fixed time interval. Experimental evidence shows that subjects increase their contributions in order to finance the cost of the good. The public good is financed more frequently when its cost is low relative to the social ability to pay.

Keywords: Public Goods; Experiments; Voluntary contributions; Dynamic contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00282669
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2008, 3 (23), pp. 1-11

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Journal Article: Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good: Experimental evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good: Experimental evidence (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00282669

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