External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation
Begoña Garcia Mariñoso,
Izabela Jelovac and
Pau Olivella
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Begoña Garcia Mariñoso: CMT - Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones - Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones
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Abstract:
External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either negotiate independently or implement ER based on the foreign price. We show that country H always prefers ER if (i) it can condition ER on the drug being subsidized in the foreign country and (ii) copayments are higher in H than in F. H's preference isreinforced when the difference between country copayments is large and/or H's population is small. External referencing by H always harms F if (ii) holds, but less so if (i) holds.
Keywords: pharmaceuticals; external referencing; price negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00303682
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Published in Health Economics, 2011, 20 (6), pp. 737-756. ⟨10.1002/hec.1630⟩
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Related works:
Journal Article: External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation (2011)
Working Paper: External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation (2010)
Working Paper: External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00303682
DOI: 10.1002/hec.1630
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