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Disposition à payer pour une réputation: une étude expérimentale sur les mécanismes d'évaluation

Marianne Lumeau (), David Masclet () and Thierry Pénard ()
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Marianne Lumeau: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: reputation mechanisms; reciprocity; fear of retaliation; last minute feedback; informational content; réputation; réciprocité; mécanisme d'évaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00326859
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Published in European Regional Meeting of ESA (Economic Science Association), Sep 2008, Lyon, France

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