Performance-related pay and work motivation: theoretical and empirical perspectives for the French civil service

Forest Virginie ()
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Forest Virginie: LEFI - Laboratoire d'Economie de la Firme et des Institutions - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2

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Abstract: At a time when the civil services of most OECD countries have embarked on aprocess of modernization of their practices, we are questioning the relevance ofintroducing performance-related pay systems, particularly in view of the, moreoften than not, negative effects on the work motivation of civil servants. TheFrench civil service has recently decided to pay a part of its public officials on thebasis of their performance, and we show how these individualized remunerationpractices can, in the long term, undermine the public service motivations that drivesome civil servants. Our reasoning is supported by the empirical results of studiesconducted in the United States, in England and also in France, as well as on thedevelopments of intrinsic motivation theories, combined with the developmentsof the public service motivation theory.

Keywords: civil service; intrinsic motivation; performance; performance-related pay; public service motivations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in International Review of Administraive Science, 2008, 74 (2), pp.325-339

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00380564

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