Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides

Bernard de Meyer (), Ehud Lehrer () and Dinah Rosenberg ()
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Bernard de Meyer: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Ehud Lehrer: TAU - School of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Raymond and Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Tel Aviv University
Dinah Rosenberg: LAGA - Laboratoire Analyse, Géométrie et Applications - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - Institut Galilée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In a Bayesian game some players might receive a noisy signal regarding the specific game actually being played before it starts. We study zero-sum games where each player receives a partial information about his own type and no information about that of the other player and analyze the impact the signals have on the payoffs. It turns out that the functions that evaluate the value of information share two property. The first is Blackwell monotonicity, which means that each player gains from knowing more. The second is concavity on the space of conditional probabilities.

Keywords: Value of information; Blackwell monotonicity; concavity; Valeur de l'information; monotonie à la Blackwell; concavité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00390625v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in 2009

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