Equilibre compétitif et contrainte budgétaire dans une ligue de sport professionnel

Wladimir Andreff ()
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Wladimir Andreff: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: American modelling of competitive balance in professional team sports leagues is unsuited to analyse European football. It objects pro-competitive balance regulation as being non Walrasian when teams are profit maximising. Testing the model comes out with mitigated results. Such approach has recently been outdated by models with win maximising clubs under a budget constraint and a flexible supply of talent in a non cooperative game. This article ploughs into three research paths suggesting the introduction of a sport contention variable; advocating for a disequilibrium model where clubs would have a "soft" budget constraint rooted in their weak governance; and it empirically tests a vicious circle between tv rights revenues and wages in French football.

Keywords: sport professionnel; équilibre walrasien; équilibre compétitif; théorie des jeux; déséquilibres financiers; contrainte budgétaire molle; gouvernance des clubs; salaires; droits de télévision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Revue Economique, 2009, 60 (3), pp.591-633

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00394910

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