Should executive compensation rules govern Audit fees ? An anlysis of executive compensation driven frauds

Cédric Lesage and Franck Moraux ()
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Cédric Lesage: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Executive compensation incentives are designed to align the interrests of both managers and shareholders. Managers may however manipulate the underlying state variable under his/her responsabiity. A higher audit effort is therefore necessary to detect potential manipulation. This paper develops an analytical model examining relations between the executive compensation scheme, the fraud mechanism and the audit effort...

Keywords: Executive compensation scheme; fraud mechanism; audit effort; fraud costs; audit fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-23
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Published in 2009 International Decision Sciences Institute Conference, Jun 2009, Nancy, France. 22 p

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Working Paper: Should Executive Compensation rules govern Audit fees? An Analysis of Executive Compensation driven Frauds (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00419726

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