La responsabilité du FMI et de la Banque mondiale dans le conflit en Côte d'Ivoire

Bernard Conte ()
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Bernard Conte: CEAN - Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire. Politique, sociétés, relations internationales au Sud - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux 4 - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: A long time presented as a haven of peace in a continent characterized by chronic instability, Côte d'Ivoire goes trough an unrest period punctuated with the coup d'État of December 1999, then with new attempt in September 2002 which, de facto, led to country partition and to a lasting « neither war nor peace » situation. Our assumption is that rise of instability is, to some extent, due to international financial institutions intervention, which, through successive adjustment programs, tried to impose the neoliberal model, upsetting former balances, without producing new compromises likely to ensure social and political stability. In this sense, the ivorian conflict appears, at least partially, as the result of failures in the Washington (post) consensus implementation.

Keywords: Conflit armé; Intervention étrangère; Modèle économique; Situation économique; Situation politique; Banque mondiale; Fonds monétaire international; Côte d'Ivoire; France; Afrique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Published in Études internationales, 2005, 36 (2), pp.219-228

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00438231

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