Anti-Dumping and Lobbying: a Signaling Game Approach

Eric Malin, Farid Gasmi and François Tandé
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Farid Gasmi: GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
François Tandé: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: antidumping; lobbying; signalling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Published in 2007

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Working Paper: Anti-Dumping and Lobbying: a Signaling Game Approach (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00440477

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