GOUVERNANCE FAMILIALE ET REPARTITION DE LA VALEUR: ETUDE DES POLITIQUES DE DISTRIBUTION AUX ACTIONNAIRES DES ENTREPRISES FAMILIALES COTEES

Patrice Charlier and Céline Du Boys (celine.duboys@univ-amu.fr)
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Céline Du Boys: CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon

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Abstract: This paper studies payout policies of listed family firms. It analyzes the amount of payout but also the choice between dividends or shares repurchase. The recent evolutions of family firms modelization bring to study two types of agency conflicts, the one between shareholders and manager (type I), and the one between majority and minority shareholders (type II). Our results show that payout policies are related to the intensity of the two types of agency conflicts which are overall less strong than in non family firms. It appears a different repartition of value in family firms, as payout is smaller. In addition, the paper suggests payout policies are used to modify the repartition of power. Family minority shareholder favours share repurchases that enables a concentration of control.

Keywords: dividend; shares repurchases; family governance; agency conflicts; repartition of value; dividende; rachat d'actions; gouvernance familiale; conflits d'agence type I et II; répartition de la valeur (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-27
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00455729v1
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Published in La place de la dimension européenne dans la Comptabilité Contrôle Audit, May 2009, France. pp.CD ROM

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00455729

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