Revisiting Nash wages negotiations in matching models

Samir Amine, Sylvain Baumann (), Pedro Lages dos Santos and Fabrice Valognes ()
Additional contact information
Samir Amine: CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations
Sylvain Baumann: CERENE - Centre d'Etude et de Recherche en économiE et gestioN LogistiquE - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université
Pedro Lages dos Santos: CERENE - Centre d'Etude et de Recherche en économiE et gestioN LogistiquE - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université
Fabrice Valognes: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: Game Theory; Matching; Nash bargaining; Kalai-Smorodinski; Labour Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (04), pp.3203-3213

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00456560

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