L'INFLUENCE SUR LA REMUNERATION DES DIRIGEANTS DES LIENS HUMAINS ENTRE LES ADMINISTRATEURS DES SOCIETES COTEES: UNE ANALYSE DU RESEAU DES SOCIETES COTEES AU SBF 250

Ali Dardour
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Ali Dardour: École doctorale de Sciences de Gestion - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse

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Abstract: This article aims to study the structure of the board's interlocks and its influence on the incentive compensation of the company first executive. A database of 181 executives of the SBF 250 companies between 2002 and 2005 is chosen. Our results show that board position in the network of human links, apprehended by the closeness centrality, has a positive impact on the executive incentive compensation. However, in contrast with our expectations, the executive "plurality of mandates" has no significant influence on the incentive part in its global compensation.

Keywords: incentive compensation; first executive; plurality of mandates; board centrality.; rémunération incitative; premier dirigeant; cumul des mandats; centralité du conseil. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-27
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Published in La place de la dimension européenne dans la Comptabilité Contrôle Audit, May 2009, Strasbourg, France. pp.CD ROM

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00459365

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