Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises

Laurent Vilanova ()

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Abstract: During the last decade, there was a growing body of case law of lender liability in the United States and France. This doctrine, whose prime goal is to protect investors against opportunism by banks, limits the involvement of banks in the management of commercial firms. This article explores the consequences of this doctrine of lender liability. We ask three questions : what's the « dark side » of relationship banking ? Why do we see such variation across countries concerning lender liability ? Is the lender liability doctrine efficient ?

Keywords: Banks; Lender liability; Financial distress; Banques; Responsabilité bancaire; Entreprises en difficulté (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2002, 5 (4), pp.137-175

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Journal Article: Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00467737

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