Démonétisation en Russie. Un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi

Sophie Brana and Mathilde Maurel

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Abstract: The increase in non-monetary payments in Russia is the output of both a tight monetary policy and the persistence of the soft budget constraint. The State, by allowing fiscal arrears and in-kind payments, and the enterprises, by using wage arrears as a way of accommodating the budget constraint, make a short term arbitrage which favours the level of employment and further delay in restructuring. Unemployment is positively correlated in the long run with fiscal and wage arrears, but in the short run, any increase in the latter has a positive impact on the fluctuation of employment.

Keywords: Démonétisation; Russie (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Published in Revue Economique, 2001, 52 (4), pp.841-859. ⟨10.2307/3502914⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Démonétisation en Russie. Un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi (2001)
Journal Article: Démonétisation en Russie. Un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi (2001)
Working Paper: Démonétisation en Russie: un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi (2001)
Working Paper: Démonétisation en Russie: un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00468757

DOI: 10.2307/3502914

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