On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions

Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou and Xingyu Zhao
Additional contact information
Issofa Moyouwou: MASS - UY1 - Université de Yaoundé I
Xingyu Zhao: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Intuitively, a voting rule satisfies the condition of positive association if it guarantees that an improvement for an alternative in the preferences expressed by voters results in a change, if there is any, of the social status of that alternative in the same direction. In this article, we consider two interpretations of this notion, and for parliamentary voting procedures, we provide results showing under the impartial anonymous culture (IAC) hypothesis how often the positive association is (not) satisfied. Furthermore, our analysis also permits us to investigate the relationships between these notions.

Keywords: strong monotonicity; maskin; monotonicity; strategy; proofeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35 (1), pp.107-127. ⟨10.1007/s00355-009-0432-2⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00476317

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0432-2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().