Auctions, ex-post competition and prices: the efficiency of public-private partnerships

Eshien Chong (), Freddy Huet () and Stephane Saussier ()
Additional contact information
Freddy Huet: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Using an original database concerning 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by a ‘competition effect' between private operators. However, a competition effect between private operators and public management appears to be crucial in explaining prices combined with a ‘termination effect', reflecting the fact that the contract is close to being renewed, and hence re-auctioned.

Keywords: public services; contractual choices; franchise bidding; public-private partnerships; competition and prices; concession contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2006, 77 (4), pp.521-554

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: AUCTIONS, EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00479482

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().