Further Consideration of the Existence of Nash Equilibria in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Abderrahmane Ziad

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Abstract: In this methodological paper, we prove that the key tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988), extended to asymmetric regions, possesses a Nash equilibrium under several assumptions commonly adopted in the literature: goods are supposed to be normal; the public good is assumed to be a desired good; the demand for capital is concave; and the elasticity of the marginal product is bounded. The general framework we develop enrables us to obtain very tractable results. By applying our method to several examples with standard production functions, we show that it is easy to use.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; tax competition; Equilibre de Nash; concurrence fiscale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00492098v1
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Published in 2010

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Related works:
Working Paper: Further Consideration of the Existence of Nash Equilibria in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game (2010)
Working Paper: Further Consideration of the Existence of Nash Equilibria in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00492098

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