Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets
Gaël Giraud and
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We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of constrained optimal outcomes in a two-period economy with incomplete markets. Allowing both for price observation, price-manipulation and a minimal amount of coordination enables to recover (second-best) efficiency at equilibrium, therefore to do better than perfect competition. To make this point, we construct a feasible price-quantity mechanism for two-period economies. In the absence of monitoring between the first and the second period, one gets a full implementation of the (typically inefficient) GEI equilibria via Nash equilibria. By contrast, when actions are observed between the two periods, a large subset of feasible and individually rational allocations can be obtained as strategic equilibria. Furthermore, the correspondence of individually rational, second-best efficient outcomes is implemented via undominated Nash equilibria (NE).
Keywords: Incomplete markets; Mechanism design; Monitoring; Constrained efficiency; Inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003, 39 (5-6), pp.559-583. ⟨10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00017-X⟩
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Journal Article: Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00499288
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