Notes sur les jeux stratégiques de marchés

Gaël Giraud

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Abstract: Notes on Strategic Market Games One briefly presents strategic market games à la Shapley and Shubik (1977) within exchange economies. Their properties are compared with the usual ones of Walrasian equilibrium in perfect competition. One examines whether this kind of models can be a framework to study imperfect competition in general equilibrium.

Keywords: Jeux; de; marchés (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Published in Cahiers d'Economie Politique = Papers in political economy, 2000, 37, pp.257-272. ⟨10.3406/cep.2000.1298⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00499316

DOI: 10.3406/cep.2000.1298

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