UN TEST DE LA THÉORIE DU FINANCEMENT HIÉRARCHISÉ SUR DONNÉES DE PANEL FRANÇAISES

Eric Molay ()
Additional contact information
Eric Molay: CRIFP - Centre de Recherche en Ingénierie Financière et Finances Publiques - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019)

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The French firms at the Paris stock exchange seem to adopt a financing hierarchy by privileging internal resources to external resources. When using external financing, debt is preferred to eq-uity. The validation of the pecking order theory is based on the existence of asymmetric informa-tion involving adverse selection problems. This study confirms the role of asymmetric informa-tion on the choice of financing of the French firms. The firms most sensitive to asymmetric in-formation prefer debt financing. On the contrary, the firms less affected by adverse selection problems prefer equity financing.

Keywords: asymmetric information; capital structure; pecking order theory; static trade-off; asymétrie informationnelle; financement hiérarchisé; ratio d'endettement optimal; structure financière du capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00515707
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in 23ème Conférence Internationale de l'AFFI, Jun 2006, Poitiers, France

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00515707/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00515707

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().