La demande de la qualité de l'audit externe: Quel apport de la théorie d'agence dans le contexte tunisien ?

Ezzeddine Abaoub and Soumaya Ayedi Chabchoub
Additional contact information
Ezzeddine Abaoub: Laboratoire de Recherche en Finance, Comptabilité et d'Intermédiation Financière - faculté des sciences économiques et de gestion de tunis
Soumaya Ayedi Chabchoub: Laboratoire de Recherche en Finance, Comptabilité et d'Intermédiation Financière - faculté des sciences économiques et de gestion de tunis

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the explanatory power of agency theory on the external audit quality demand in a Tunisian context. We use auditor reputation as a proxy for a higher audit quality. The results of panel logistic estimation on a sample of 166 firm-years show that a negative relationship is established between concentrated ownership (which measures the minority/majority shareholders agency conflict), long term leverage (a proxy of the shareholders/creditors' agency conflict) and the audit quality demand. Our study shows also, that firm size experiences a positive impact on external auditor choice. On the other hand, it seems that board of directors' independence and institutional ownership influence positively the external audit quality demand.

Keywords: audit quality; agency conflicts; panel logit; listed firms; qualité d'audit; conflit d'agence; analyse longitudinale; entreprises cotées (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00522064
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in « LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE », May 2008, France. pp.CD Rom

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00522064/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00522064

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().