Gouvernance, enracinement et performance des entreprises familiales européennes

Patrice Charlier

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Abstract: The performance of the family firms can be analyzed according to their modes of governance, based on answers to the various assumptions of family entrenchment. The traditional assumption of the « illegitimate » entrenchment is tested by differentiating two modes of governance likely to reduce the negative effects of them : that of the companies controlled by a family with a external leader, and that of the companies directed by a family which no longer is the principal shareholder. The assumption of the « positive » entrenchment or « legitimates » is also tested when the company is controlled and directed by the family. The results of the tests carried out on a sample of European medium-size firms seem to confirm the assumption of a negative family entrenchment.

Keywords: family firm; agency theory; modes of governance; entrenchment; entreprise familiale; théorie de l'agence; modes de gouvernance; enracinement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00522463
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, May 2008, France. pp.CD Rom

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00522463

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