De l'indépendance individuelle à l'indépendance collective de l'audit: l'apport de la théorie systémique

Tiphaine Compernolle
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Tiphaine Compernolle: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The external auditor isn't the only actor who has an auditing mission. Audit committee's directors and internal auditors have one of it. Their interactions can influence external auditor's independence. This study is interested in the means by which these relations influence external auditor's independence. The analysis of 21 conversations from the approach proposed by Crozier and Friedberg ( 1977 ) shows that these relations are formal relations of accountability and informal relations of opinions' exchange. Formal relations have two modes of action on external auditor's independence. On one side, external auditors use these to ease management's pressures. On other one, in order to avoid these accountability relations, external auditors come closer to the management. Informal relations of opinions' exchange allow the existence of collective independence, which leads the actors towards a more important objectivity of opinion.

Keywords: auditing; independence; concrete system of action; audit; indépendance; système d'action concret (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00522496v1
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Published in LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, May 2008, France. pp.CD Rom

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