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Transferts négociés de blocs de contrôle, bénéfices privés et protection des actionnaires minoritaires

Salma Fourati
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Salma Fourati: ISG Tunis - ISG Tunis

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Abstract: Control blocks transfers offer a particularly interesting framework to estimate private benefits of control. In addition, these operations can have important consequences on the various parties (the target firm, the acquirer, the minority shareholders) particularly in the presence of a legal mechanism of protection of minority shareholders such as the price guarantee (adopted in France). We estimate the extent of the private benefit of control through the premium paid in private block negotiations, then, we evaluate the effectiveness of the equal opportunity rule to protect the minority shareholder interests. Empirical estimates show high level of private benefits since the premium paid by control block acquirer is about 20%. Our study reveals that the mechanism of price guarantee contributes to protect the minority shareholders, in particular, the utility of this regulation is more justified for transfers that modify the ownership structure of the target firm; on the other hand, the choice of the minority shareholders to exercise their exit option can be directed by the initiator through communicated information.

Keywords: blocs de contrôle; actionnaires minoritaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00524890
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Published in LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, May 2008, France. pp.CD Rom

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