Performance Measures of Actively Managed Equity Mutual Funds

Radu Burlacu (), P. Fontaine and S. Jimenez-Garces ()
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Radu Burlacu: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
P. Fontaine: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
S. Jimenez-Garces: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We study the performance of US actively managed equity mutual funds with traditional models and find, as in previous studies, that they obtain negative performance. We argue that this pessimistic result is explained by the excessively high expenses charged by managers. Managers justify these costs as being generated by their information acquisition activity.

Keywords: private information; information risk; actively managed equity mutual funds; selectivity performance; rational expectations equilibrium models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00533093v1
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Published in 2009, 21p

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00533093

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