Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design

Monique Florenzano

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Abstract: Focusing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accomodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions.

Keywords: Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell-Foley equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; free-rider problem; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; principal-agent models; Equilibre de Lindahl; équilibre public compétitif; équilibre de provision privée; problème du passager clandestin; théorie des mécanismes; modèles de principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00543296v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in 2010

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Related works:
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00543296

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