The search for the holy Grail: combining decentralised planning and contracting mechanisms in the French health care system

Martine Marie Bellanger () and Philippe Mossé ()
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Martine Marie Bellanger: LAPSS - Laboratoire d'analyse des politiques sociales et sanitaires - EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP], ENSP Rennes (devenue EHESP)
Philippe Mossé: LEST - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Sociologie du Travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: France has recently adopted one of the least market-oriented models for reforming its health care system, where competition does not feature at all prominently in the overall policy design.This country has a strong tradition of top-down public administration, and health professionals, trade unions and the general public are all uneasy about the idea of introducing market forces and privatising public health provision. The main reforms discussed in this article were based on planning, rationalisation, cost-containment, efficiency and equity. However, some embryonic changes and emerging practices can be detected which might seem to relate to the ‘new public management' approach, and which could also serve as a basis for future market initiatives.

Keywords: resource allocation; contracting; efficiency; equity; France (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Published in Health Economics, 2005, 14, pp.S119 - S132. ⟨10.1002/hec.1031⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00551874

DOI: 10.1002/hec.1031

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