A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting

Ronan Congar () and Vincent Merlin ()
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Ronan Congar: CARE - Centre d'Analyse et de Recherche en Économie - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université

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Abstract: In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters' preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287-316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and Weak Separability. In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule.

Keywords: maximin; voting; ignorance; duplication; separability; scoring rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2012, 72, pp.131-147. ⟨10.1007/s11238-010-9229-0⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00554833

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-010-9229-0

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