A Framed-field experiment on Approval voting and Evaluation voting

Antoinette Baujard and Herrade Igersheim

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Abstract: This paper presents the framed-field experiment on Approval Voting and (+2,+1,0) Evaluation Voting rules that took place during the 2007 French presidential elections. We first describe the experimental design and give the main results. Then, we compare the two tested voting rules with the two-round system currently used in the French presidential elections. Our comparison is notably based on the questionnaires collected during the experiment in which many participants have expressed their frustration due to the current voting system, and their desire of expression and transparency.

Keywords: Experiments; voting rules; approval voting; evaluation voting; plurality vote; expression; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Springer Science. In situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections, Springer, pp.69-89, 2011, Studies in Public Choice, ⟨10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00564256

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3

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