Normative Criteria of Social Choice

Antoinette Baujard and Maurice Salles

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Abstract: We present major results of social choice choice focusing on results pertaining to the normative aspects of this theory. We cover Arrow's impossibility theorem, Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on the manipulability of voting rules, Black's analysis of majority rule, Harsanyi's utilitarianism theorem and results relating social choice to social justice.

Keywords: Choix social; justice sociale; Social choice; social justice; preference; aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
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Published in Ian C. Jarvie and Jesus Zamora-Bonilla. The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, Sage, pp.362-385, 2011

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00575078

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