The effect of perfect monitoring of matched income on sales tax compliance: An experimental investigation
David Masclet () and
Claude Montmarquette ()
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Cathleen Johnson: CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal
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Keywords: perfect monitoring; tax; experimental economics; reference dependent effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in National Tax Journal, Nta-tia National Tax Association, 2010, 63 (1), pp.121-148
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Journal Article: The Effect of Perfect Monitoring of Matched Income on Sales Tax Compliance: An Experimental Investigation (2010)
Working Paper: The Effect of Perfect Monitoring of Matched Income on Sales Tax Compliance: An Experimental Investigation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00601691
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