Manipulation of the Borda rule by introduction of a similar candidate

Jérôme Serais ()
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Jérôme Serais: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting situations where this manipulation is efficient for the Borda rule and express its vulnerability for a 3 alternative election.

Keywords: Borda rule; election contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (1), pp.749-758

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00603045

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