Corporate acquisistion process: is there an optimal cash-equity payment mix?

Hubert de La Bruslerie

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Abstract: This paper examines the combination of cash and share payments proposed in the corporate acquisition process. Particularly, it analyzes the conditions of an optimal mixed payment in the context of an asymmetry of information. Using a model, we highlight that setting the conditions of payment is an endogenous part of a takeover agreement between the acquirer and the target. Our contribution is to show how, in the acquisition process, the setting of the cash percentage is a key element for conveying private information on the gains of synergy and the gains that result from the transaction. In our model, we internalize asymmetries of information and possible exaggeration biases. Both will influence the joint setting of a mixed payment scheme.

Keywords: mergers and acquisitions; information asymmetry; means of payment; contractual approach; synergy gains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00636349v1
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2012, 32, pp.83-94. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2011.07.003⟩

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Journal Article: Corporate acquisition process: Is there an optimal cash-equity payment mix? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00636349

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.07.003

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