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En toutes franchises: de la capacité d'obéissance à la capacité d'initiative

Délila Allam ()
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Délila Allam: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Coordination and franchise: from an obedience to an capacity of initiative Summary Franchise networks are a form of collective entrepreneurship that bring together entrepreneurs spread over an economic territory who choose to act in a concerted and consistent manner with regard to the expectations of consumers. This hybrid form of coordination is different from both the market and the firm and responds to a new economic environment. In this paper, I seek to analyze this phenomenon byexamining the recruitment criteria for prospective franchisees and their managerial consequences.

Keywords: incertainty and franchising relationship; Coordination; incertitude et relation de franchise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00643792
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Published in Economie et Société, séries dynamique technologie et organisation, 2011, 13, pp.941-956

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