Les raisons d'être de la franchise dans les transactions de services aux entreprises

Délila Allam ()
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Délila Allam: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The Reason for the Franchise in Transactions Business Services Abstract - The franchise, as hybrid form of coordination undertake an asymmetric allocation of legal and economic rights between the parties. The franchise is a governance structure that is particularly successful in achieving balance incentive and control. However, business services represent less than 7% of franchise networks in France. We study why the markets for business services could become "new land of conquest" for the franchise.

Keywords: franchise contract; hybrid form of coordination; intangible asset; network externality; relationship of authority; control and economic rights.; contrat de franchise; forme hybride de coordination; actif immatériel; externalité de réseau; relation d'autorité; contrôle et droits économiques.; contrôle et droits économiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07-15
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Published in Revue management & avenir, 2008, 22, pp.137-154

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